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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV of the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RICKY PAU1ER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No- 890583-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the warrantless x-ray of Mr. Palmer violate the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution? 
A. Were there exigent circumstances sufficient to 
dispense with the warrant requirement? 
B. Was there a "clear indication" the ring would be 
found inside Appellant? 
C. Was the x-ray a reasonable method for locating 
the ring and was it carried out in a reasonable manner? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for Retail 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-6-602(3) (1953 as amended). Appellant filed a Motion to 
Suppress (R. 27) (see Addendum A) which the trial court heard on 
August 23, 1989. The trial court denied that motion (T. 81). 
Immediately thereafter, Appellant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 
1988) , whereby Appellant explicitly preserved his right to appeal 
the trial court's denial of the Motion to Suppress (R. 37, 
T. 81-2). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 3, 1989, at approximately 6:20 p.m., Lisa Hurtado, a 
part-time security guard at Sears, received a page calling her to 
the jewelry counter. According to Ms. Hurtado, when she arrived at 
the jewelry counter, the salesman informed her that a customer had 
switched a diamond ring and had just left the store through a door 
which was about eight feet away (T. 5). Ms. Hurtado examined the 
switched ring, then went out the door after the customer (T. 5). 
When Ms. Hurtado got outside the door, she saw a young man 
walking at a slow pace near the car closest to the store (T. 6). 
She followed the young man as he walked to the south and watched him 
to make sure that he did not discard anything (T. 7). She did not 
see him make any throwing motions while watching him (T. 7). 
A backup security guard joined the first guard, and the 
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pair stopped the young man across the street from Sears and told him 
that they were from the store and would like him to return to the 
store with them (T. 7-8). They initially told him that they had 
stopped him in conjunction with the diamond ring he had just looked 
at (T. 8). The young man, the Defendant in this case, agreed to 
return to the store with the pair (T. 8)• 
After the trio entered the Sears security office, the 
guards informed Mr. Palmer that they believed he had switched a fake 
ring with the Sears diamond ring. Mr. Palmer denied that assertion 
and said that he did not have the ring (T. 9). 
A security officer did a pat-down search of Mr. Palmer's 
clothes but did not find the ring (T. 9). Ms. Hurtado checked on 
the computer to be sure that the ring in question had not been 
purchased, then telephoned police (T. 11). 
Officer Hendrix was the first officer to arrive, followed 
later by two backup officers. The officers were uncertain as to how 
to proceed, so they called their supervisor, Sgt. Mayo, who also 
went to the store (T. 12). Sgt. Mayo and another officer searched 
Mr. Palmer's clothing and strip-searched Mr. Palmer at the Sears 
security office (T. 28, 29). Sgt. Mayo then called the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's office for advice on how to proceed (T. 28). 
Sgt. Mayo also called the jail and was told that, although 
Mr. Palmer could be placed in isolation in a cell with a toilet that 
did not flush, he could not be watched constantly (T. 33-4). 
Sgt. Mayo then "negotiated" with Mr. Palmer and requested 
consent from Mr. Palmer to submit him to an x-ray (T. 28, 30, 31). 
Mr. Palmer asked a couple of "what if" questions, then, according to 
Ms. Hurtado, said, "Well, I guess I will submit to the x-ray then. 
It really doesn't make a difference" (T. 13). 
Sgt. Mayo told the officers to take Mr. Palmer to the 
hospital for an x-ray and to advise the Sergeant of the results 
(T. 28-9). It was getting dark at that point, and cars were leaving 
the Sears parking lot (T. 29). Sgt. Mayo was convinced Mr. Palmer 
had swallowed the ring, but, if he was wrong and the x-ray was 
negative, he intended to send more officers to search the portion of 
the Sears parking lot where cars had been parked (T. 37). 
According to Ms. Hurtado, before leaving for the hospital, 
Appellant said something indicating that he might have had the ring 
and might have thrown it on the roof (T. 14). A security guard 
apparently got on the roof and searched the ledge (T. 14). 
Ms. Hurtado also conducted two "walk through" searches, 
retracing the steps Mr. Palmer had apparently taken. One of those 
"walk through" searches was with store personnel and the other with 
police officers (T. 15). She, along with two other security guards, 
also searched the garbage can, balloon machine and pay telephones 
and thoroughly searched the entry way and portion of the driveway 
where Mr. Palmer had passed unobserved (T. 21-2). Four or five 
officers also thoroughly searched the Sears parking lot in an effort 
to locate the ring (T. 27, 36). 
Sgt. Mayo understood that Mr. Palmer had been watched at 
all times after leaving the jewelry counter (T. 37). Although the 
Sergeant acknowledged that it would take less than two hours to 
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obtain a warrant by telephone, based on his conversation with a 
Deputy County Attorney, he believed that he did not need a warrant 
(T. 40, 41). 
At about 7:20 p.m., Officer Hendrix left Sears to take 
Mr. Palmer to the hospital for an x-ray. It was starting to get 
dark at that time (T. 13, 15). 
At the hospital, Mr. Palmer informed the officers that he 
did not want to be x-rayed (T. 46, 50, 58). The officers told him 
he had no choice (T. 46, 50). The officers believed that, based on 
the information conveyed by Sgt. Mayo, they did not need consent or 
a search warrant to x-ray Mr. Palmer (T. 61). 
When Mr. Palmer was informed that he would be required to 
have an x-ray regardless of his lack of consent, he became combative 
and, according to the x-ray technician, attempted to kick the x-ray 
tube (T. 46, 50-1). It was clear that Mr. Palmer's combativeness 
was resistance to being x-rayed and would end if the officers 
stopped trying to x-ray him (T. 51). 
At least three officers pinned Mr. Palmer to the wall 
(T. 52). One grabbed him by the throat, and the others restrained 
him; they then dragged him, struggling, to the x-ray table (T. 52). 
Mr. Palmer was in handcuffs at this time, and the officers 
physically led him to the table and placed him on that table. They 
placed a restraint over his upper thighs, and an officer held him 
down on the table (T. 53). The officer who remained in the room to 
hold down Mr. Palmer was given a lead gown to cover himself because 
of the risk of radiation affecting him (T. 53-54). The x-ray 
technician pointed out that he had refused to do x-rays on patients 
because of the risk (T. 54). 
The x-ray procedure was completed at 9:30 p.m. (T. 45). A 
shape resembling a ring was evident in the x-ray (T. 46). 
The officers arrested Mr. Palmer and placed him in an 
isolation cell at the Salt Lake County Jail. The environment in the 
isolation cell was controlled so that feces were not able to leave 
(T. 61). Mr. Palmer thereafter "passed" the ring and officers 
recovered it (T. 61-2). 
Mr. Palmer filed a motion to suppress the x-ray and all 
evidence arising therefrom, including the ring, based upon the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution (see Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A police ordered x-ray of an individual is a search which 
is protected by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. 
In determining whether a warrantless x-ray search violates the 
fourth amendment, all three prongs of the test for bodily intrusion 
searches outlined in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
must be met. That test is: (1) exigent circumstances which justify 
the warrantless bodily intrusion exist, (2) there is a clear 
indication the evidence will be found where anticipated, and (3) the 
intrusion is a reasonable method for obtaining the evidence and was 
carried out in a reasonable manner. 
Exigent circumstances which would justify dispensing with 
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the warrant requirement did not exist in this case. Where the 
police seek to make a bodily intrusion of an in-custody defendant, a 
very strong preference for a warrant exists. The slight chance that 
the officers would have to search a portion of the parking lot if 
the ring were not located inside the Appellant is not an exigent 
circumstance. 
A "clear indication" requires, at the very least, probable 
cause to believe the ring would be found inside Appellant. No one 
testified that he or she saw Appellant in possession of the ring or 
make any moves suggesting he might have swallowed it, and Appellant 
was unobserved for a period of time during which he could have 
handed the ring to another person. Therefore, there was not a 
"clear indication" that the ring would be located inside Mr. Palmer 
during the x-ray procedure. 
Because of the potential risk of harm to an individual's 
physical and genetic well-being, x-rays are a highy intrusive 
procedure. Less intrusive alternatives existed in this case. The 
method was therefore unreasonable under the circumstances of this 
case. 
The excessive use of force, including an officer grabbing 
Appellant by the throat and holding him in that position while other 
officers also held him as he struggled was an unreasonable manner in 
which to conduct the x-ray. 
Because the warrantless x-ray search violated the fourth 
amendment, the x-ray and ring seized as a result of the x-ray should 
be suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE WARRANTLESS X-RAY OF APPELLANT VIOLATED 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
The general rule under the fourth amendment is that officers must 
obtain a search warrant for searches of homes, personal effects, and 
intrusions into the body. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 770 (1966). Warrantless searches are considered per se 
unreasonable unless the State sustains its burden of proving that 
the warrantless search is justified under an exception to the 
warrant requirement. See State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 359 (Ha. 
1982); People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d 445, 447 (111. App. 5 Dist. 
1987); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
Although the importance of having a neutral, informed and 
detached magistrate assess whether a search is appropriate is 
emphasized throughout fourth amendment case law, the role of a 
neutral magistrate takes on increased importance where the decision 
is whether to invade a person's body. The Schmerber Court 
acknowledged that the role of a neutral magistrate in bodily 
intrusion searches was "indisputable and great" and recognized a 
greater interest in keeping one's body free from unreasonable 
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intrusions than in protecting one's home. Id. The Court stated: 
Because we are dealing with intrusions into the 
human body rather than state interference with 
property relationships or private papers—"houses, 
papers and effects"—we write on a clean slate. 
Id. at 767-8. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753f 760 (1985), the 
Court noted that the bodily intrusion in Schmerber; 
perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and 
deep rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court 
recognized that fourth amendment analysis does 
require a discerning inquiry into the facts and 
circumstances to determine whether the intrusion was 
justifiable. 
(Emphasis added.) In State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 355, 359 (Haw. 1982), 
the Court noted that: "There is no expectation of privacy of 
greater legitimacy than that which we have in our 'private parts' 
(footnote omitted)." 
In addition, when an individual is in custody, the 
importance of having a neutral magistrate assess the evidence before 
conducting a search becomes increasingly important, while the 
reasons for dispensing with the warrant "evaporate." See United 
States v. Montova de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 553 n.21 (1985) 
(citing Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)). Hence, where 
the State contemplates a bodily intrusion of an in-custody 
defendant, there is a strong preference for a search warrant. 
Schmerber is the lead case discussing the interaction 
between the fourth amendment and bodily intrusions by the State. In 
Schmerber, officers arrested the defendant for driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Without obtaining a search warrant, officers 
directed a physician to withdraw blood from the defendant for a 
chemical analysis of blood alcohol content. The Court held that the 
defendant's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights were not violated 
under the circumstances of the case since (1) exigent circumstances 
existed which justified the immediate withdrawal of the blood 
without waiting for a warrant because during any delay, the alcohol 
would be absorbed by the defendant's body and the blood alcohol 
level dissipate, (2) there was a clear indication that alcohol would 
be found in the defendant's bloodstream, and (3) the blood alcohol 
test chosen was a reasonable test for determining blood alcohol 
content and was performed in a reasonable manner. The Schmerber 
Court cautioned, however, that its holding that "the Constitution 
does not forbid the state's minor intrusions into an individual's 
body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that 
it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other 
conditions." Id. at 772. 
The initial inquiry where the State has invaded an 
individual's body without a warrant is whether the nature of the 
invasion amounts to a search or seizure, implicating the fourth 
amendment, or is so minor that the fourth amendment is not 
applicable. It is well accepted by courts which have addressed the 
issue that an x-ray is a bodily intrusion which falls within the 
protection of the fourth amendment.1 See United States v. Allen, 
1
 At least one court seems to have characterized an x-ray 
as a "seizure" (see United States v. Allen, 337 F.Supp. at 1043) 
while most courts consider it a search (see, e.g., United States v. 
Ek, 676 F.2d at 382-3). As the Schmerber Court noted, "[S]uch 
testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 'persons,' and 
(continued) 
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337 F.Supp. 1041, 1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Ek, 676 
F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Anonymous, 353 A.2d 789, 
794-5 (Conn. 1976); State v. Mabon, 648 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tenn. Cr. 
App. 1982); People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2nd at 447. 
Various courts have recognized that because x-rays 
penetrate the body and create potential health hazards for an 
individual and possibly for succeeding generations, the nature of 
the intrusion is comparable to at least that of withdrawal of blood, 
and, according to some courts, on par in intrusiveness with a body 
cavity search. See United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d at 382 ("An x-ray 
search, although perhaps not so humiliating as a strip search, 
nevertheless is more intrusive since the search is potentially 
harmful to the health of the suspect."); Allen, 337 F.Supp. at 1043 
("[Considering that x-rays actually penetrate the body we cannot 
say as a matter of law that it is less an invasion than the taking 
of blood."); see generally United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
473 U.S. at 561-2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Dissent discusses 
estimates that routine medical x-rays take six days off a person's 
life expectancy and concern regarding cumulative effect of x-rays on 
individual's biological and genetic well-being.). Hence, the fourth 
amendment is applicable to the instant case where the officers 
ordered a technician to x-ray Appellant without first obtaining a 
(footnote 1 continued) 
depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning 
of that Amendment." 384 U.S. at 767. Regardless of whether an 
x-ray is characterized as a search or a seizure, the fourth 
amendment is applicable. 
warrant. 
In order for the x-ray procedure to be upheld, the State 
has the burden of proving that all three prongs of the Schmerber 
test were met. Those three prongs are: (1) exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless intrusion, (2) there was a clear 
indication evidence would be found in the place to be searched, and 
(3) the x-ray was a reasonable method for locating the evidence and 
was carried out in a reasonable manner. 
A. THERE WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY 
DISPENSING WITH THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
Although search warrants are favored where bodily 
intrusions of in-custody defendants are contemplated, courts have 
dispensed with the requirement where an emergency situation requires 
that the officers proceed without waiting for a warrant. See 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-1. An exigent circumstance, in the 
context of a bodily intrusion, has been defined as "an emergency 
which threatens destruction of the evidence during the delay 
necessary to obtain a warrant . . . ." State v. Fontenant, 383 
So.2d 365, 367 (La. 1980) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
at 770); see also Anonymous, 353 A.2d at 795 (test under Schmerber 
for whether exigent circumstances exist which justify dispensing 
with warrant requirement where bodily intrusion involved is whether 
risk exists that evidence will be destroyed during delay in 
obtaining warrant); Mabon, 648 S.W.2d at 275 (no exigent 
circumstances justifying warrantless x-rays since metal particles 
and gunshot would remain in defendant's arm indefinitely and no 
possibility evidence would disappear). 
In State v. Clark, 654 P.2d at 360, the Court held that 
exigent circumstances justifying dispensing with the warrant 
requirement did not exist since the currency the defendant was 
believed to have concealed in her vagina would not dissolve or 
otherwise dissipate while officers obtained a warrant, and officers 
could have detained the suspect in a place and manner, under 
observation, so as to preclude destruction of the evidence pending 
issuance of the warrant. See also People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 
624, 631 (Cal. 1975) (no exigent circumstances since heroin in 
balloons would not dissolve in suspect's system, and officers could 
have kept suspect in isolation cell, under surveillance, until 
balloons passed through system); Fontenant, 383 So.2d at 367 (no 
exigent circumstances where pill bottle believed to be secreted in 
vagina would not dissolve, and suspect could have been guarded and 
prevented from destroying evidence while search warrant obtained). 
The Clark Court also noted that the officers had procedures 
available to them by which they could obtain a warrant with minimal 
delay and that inconvenience to the officers in securing a warrant 
"carries little weight in this jurisdiction as a reason to bypass 
the fourth amendment. See State v. Texeira, 609 P.2d 131, 136 (Ha. 
1980)." Clark, 654 P.2d at 361. 
In the present case, the trial court found that a warrant 
was not necessary since exigent circumstances existed "because of 
the value of the ring and the approaching darkness, and the fact 
that the parking lot was such a public area" (T. 78)• The trial 
court focused on the need to search the parking lot if the ring was 
not found inside Appellant as a result of the x-ray, suggesting that 
the ring would be destroyed or concealed by someone in the parking 
lot if the officers did not act quickly in x-raying Mr. Palmer 
(T. 78, 79). Such a depiction of the exigent circumstances 
necessary to dispense with the warrant requirement where a bodily 
intrusion is involved is incorrect; the focus under Schmerber and 
the bulk of its progeny is whether the evidence, if located in the 
place or person to be searched, would disappear from that place or 
person while a warrant is being obtained, and not whether the 
officers run a risk that evidence will disappear from some other 
place if it turns out that they were wrong in believing the evidence 
was located in the place or person which was the focus of the search. 
The trial court relied on People v. Williams, 510 N.E.2d 
445 (111. App. 5 Dist. 1987), in reaching its decision that exigent 
circumstances existed because the officer would have to search the 
Sears parking lot immediately if the ring was not found inside 
Appellant. Mr. Palmer submits that the Williams Court's 
characterization of such alternate need to search as an exigent 
circumstance is incorrect under Schmerber and succeeding cases. 
Searches involving bodily intrusion are a special type of 
search, case law for which evolved from a "clean slate" in 
Schmerber. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-8, 771; Lee, 470 U.S. at 
760. Bodily intrusion searches require a "clear indication" that 
the evidence will be found as anticipated (see discussion infra at 
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18-21). If there is a "clear indication" that the evidence will be 
found during the body search, then it would be extremely unlikely 
that the evidence would be found elsewhere. This clear indication 
requirement precludes a court from finding an exigent circumstance 
based on a chance that the officers were wrong in believing that the 
item was in the body and, if proved wrong, would have to search 
elsewhere. 
In addition, the Williams exigent circumstances adopted by 
the trial court in this case would be applicable to almost any 
bodily intrusion case and, if considered a permissible exigent 
circumstance, could swallow the rule. For instance, in State v. 
Fontenant. where the Court held that exigent circumstances did not 
exist, two women left a pharmacy with a bottle of pills and were 
detained by police shortly thereafter while sitting in their car 
outside the pharmacy. 383 So.2d at 367. If the pills had not been 
found in the vagina of one of the women, officers would have 
searched the vicinity where the women had been for the pills. Along 
the same lines, in State v. Clark, had the officers not found the 
currency secreted in the defendant's vagina, they would have had to 
search the hotel room and other areas where the defendant had been 
to locate the currency. See 654 P.2d at 360-1. See also People v. 
Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 626. 
In Clark, the Court noted that "the term exigent 
circumstances is incapable of precise definition (citation 
omitted)." Clark, 654 P.2d at 360. The Court noted that exigent 
circumstances "include[] situations presenting an immediate danger 
— 1 R — 
to life or of serious injury or an immediate threatened removal or 
destruction of evidence." Id. at 360 (citation omitted). In the 
present case, the possible need to search the Sears parking lot in 
the future based on the chance that someone might find the ring and 
destroy it if it were not inside Appellant is not an immediate 
threat of destruction of the evidence. 
In the event this Court disagrees and believes that the 
chance that officers would have to search elsewhere if the evidence 
was not found inside Appellant is an exigent circumstance, the facts 
of the instant case are nevertheless distinguishable from those in 
Williams. In Williams, officers would have had to search the entire 
thoroughfare where the defendant had been. In the present case, 
Mr. Palmer was unobserved only while in the breezeway while leaving 
the store and in a small portion of the parking lot between the exit 
and the first row of cars (T. 5-6). Officers and security personnel 
had searched everywhere except under the cars (T. 9, 14, 15, 21-2, 
28, 29). If the ring was not inside Mr. Palmer, it was either under 
the cars in the parking lot or had been handed to another person 
during the period of time that Mr. Palmer was unobserved. Although 
Sgt. Mayo indicated that he would need a number of men to search the 
parking lot if the ring were not inside Mr. Palmer, the testimony as 
a whole establishes that only a small portion of the parking lot 
would have had to be searched, unlike the large vicinity that the 
officers would have had to search in Williams (T. 5-6, 37). 
Sgt. Mayo could easily have left an officer or officers to 
watch the parking lot while another officer obtained a search 
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warrant and had the x-ray taken• Had any persons bent down and 
picked something up during the interim, the remaining officer could 
have questioned such persons to make sure they did not have the 
missing ring. 
The trial court emphasized the fact that it would soon be 
dark in finding exigent circumstances. The evidence establishes 
that it was already getting dark when the officers left for the 
hospital with Appellant at approximately 7:20 p.m. (T. 15). 
Regardless of whether the officers waited for a warrant or simply 
took the x-ray without one, it was going to be dark by the time the 
x-ray was completed. It was, in fact, 9:30 p.m. and dark outside 
when the technician finished x-raying Mr. Palmer (T. 45). Hence, 
regardless of whether officers obtained a warrant, had the ring not 
been found inside Mr. Palmer, they would have been searching the 
parking lot in the dark. Approaching darkness did not, in this 
case, establish an emergency situation requiring dispensing with the 
warrant requirement. 
The trial courts reliance on the value of the ring in 
finding an exigent circumstance is also flawed (see T. 78). The 
value of an item is irrelevant in determining whether an exigent 
circumstance exists which justifies dispensing with a warrant before 
intruding on an individual's body. The appropriate focus is whether 
the evidence might be destroyed or disappear from the place to be 
searched during the delay while officers obtain a warrant. 
Furthermore, waiting for a warrant would not have diminished the 
value of the ring.2 
The State failed to sustain its burden of proving that 
exigent circumstances existed in this case so as to justify the 
intrusion in the instant case without a warrant.3 
Officers could have obtained a warrant in less than two 
hours and did not seem concerned about rushing Mr. Palmer to the 
hospital for an x-ray since at least an hour passed between the time 
when the security guard was first called and the departure of 
Mr. Palmer for the hospital (T. 4, 15). Exigent circumstances did 
not exist in this case, and Mr. Palmer's fourth amendment rights 
were therefore violated by the officers' failure to obtain a warrant 
before proceeding with the x-ray. 
B. THERE WAS NOT A "CLEAR INDICATION" THAT THE RING 
WOULD BE FOUND INSIDE APPELLANT. 
The second prong of the Schmerber test requires that there 
be a "clear indication" that the evidence sought will be found in 
order to justify a bodily intrusion. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770. 
Since the decision in Schmerber, commentators and courts have 
discussed the meaning of the term "clear indication" and "[t]he 
issue of whether this 'clear indication' requirement is more 
2
 The trial court's determination that the ring was 
valuable seems to be based on the fact that it was a diamond. No 
evidence was taken as to the value of the ring. See T. 9, 76. 
3
 The State has the burden of proving that, based on 
specific facts, exigent circumstances required proceeding without a 
warrant. See State v. Clark, 654 P.2d at 360. 
demanding than the normal probable cause requirement is a matter of 
continuing uncertainty (Compare United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, (1985), 473 U.S. 531, 539-40, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3310-11, 
87 L.Ed.2d 381, 390-91, with 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
Section 5.3(c) at 502 (2nd ed. 1987))." Williams, 510 N.E.2d at 
447; see also Note, Analyzing the Reasonableness of Bodily 
Intrusions, 68 Marq.L.Rev. 130-53 (1984). 
The usual standard under the fourth amendment requires 
officers to have probable cause to believe the evidence sought will 
be found in the place to be searched. Given the recognition in 
Schmerber that a bodily intrusion is a greater invasion than a 
search of a home or papers and permissible only in strictly limited 
circumstances, the "clear indication" requirement mandates that, at 
the very least, officers have probable cause to believe that the 
evidence sought will be found as a result of the bodily intrusion.4 
In the present case, the trial judge interpreted "clear 
indication" to mean a high probability. 
Some of the cases talk about clear indication. 
. . . The cases also say that there is not a clear 
definition of what that means, but it means more 
than probable cause. 
It means less than absolute certainty and the best 
evidence that I read was that what clear indication 
means is that there is a very high probability. 
(T. 78). 
4
 In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 759, the Court noted that 
the officers in Schmerber "clearly had probable cause . . . to 
believe that a blood test would provide evidence that was 
exceptionally probative." 
Although the trial judge believed that there was a clear 
indication that the ring was inside Appellant, the facts in this 
case indicate otherwise, Mr. Palmer was unobserved from the moment 
he left the store until several moments later when Ms. Hurtado 
observed him near the first row of cars (T. 5-6, 9-20). Ms. Hurtado 
testified that she received a call that a ring had been switched, 
went to the jewelry counter, spoke with the salesman, and examined 
the remaining ring before going outside to look for the suspect 
(T. 4-5). Although Ms. Hurtado guessed that Mr. Palmer was not 
observed "for a half minute," her own testimony suggests that he was 
actually unobserved for a longer period of time, during which he 
could easily have handed the ring to an accomplice. 
After Ms. Hurtado located Appellant in the parking lot, she 
observed him continuously (T. 6-7). While being observed, 
Mr. Palmer made no motions indicating he had swallowed the ring 
(T. 7). 
The State did not present any witnesses who had seen 
Mr. Palmer in possession of the ring or who had seen him swallow 
it. The State's witnesses did, however, establish that there were 
other people at the jewelry counter when the ring was taken, the 
parking lot was accessible to the public, and Mr. Palmer had ample 
time to dispose of the ring (T. 4-7, 10-11, 19-20). Although 
Ms. Hurtado testified that she saw no one in the parking lot when 
she exited the store, it is highly unlikely that an accomplice, once 
handed the ring, would stand around waiting for a security guard to 
arrive. The State failed to bear its burden in this case of proving 
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that the officers had a "clear indication" that the ring would be 
found inside Mr. Palmer. 
C. X-RAYING MR. PALMER UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE WAS NOT A REASONABLE METHOD, NOR WAS IT 
DONE IN A REASONABLE MANNER. 
The third prong under Schmerber requires two separate 
inquiries: (1) whether the method chosen was reasonable and 
(2) whether the manner in which the test was performed was 
reasonable. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-2. 
1. The method was not reasonable. 
In determining whether the method chosen is reasonable, 
several factors—including the degree of the intrusion; the risk of 
harm, trauma or pain; and the essentiality of the test, i.e. whether 
a less intrusive alternative exists—are relevant. See Winston v. 
Lee, 470 U.S. at 761. In Lee, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of whether a compelled surgical procedure to 
remove a bullet from a suspect's chest violated the fourth 
amendment. The Court held that such a procedure would violate the 
fourth amendment since it would intrude substantially on the 
individual's privacy interests and the State had failed to establish 
a compelling need for the evidence. 
As discussed supra at 11, the potential risks of x-rays and 
the concern that x-rays will negatively affect not only the physical 
well-being of the individual but also his or her genetic structure 
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is well documented and accepted in case law. See, e.g., Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 561-2 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ek, 676 
F.2d at 382; Mabon, 648 S.W.2d at 275. In addition, various courts 
have recognized that the intrusiveness of an x-ray is on par with 
that of a body cavity search. See, e.g., United States v. Ek, 67 6 
F.2d at 382. Furthermore, the technician who took the x-ray of 
Appellant acknowledged the risks and potential harms of x-rays and 
pointed out that because of such risks, he had on occasion refused 
to take x-rays of individuals (T. 54). Finally, the technician and 
officer present during the x-ray acknowledged the well-known and 
accepted fact that risk is associated with x-rays by placing a lead 
gown over the officer to protect him from any random rays 
(T. 53-4). The trial judge's attempts to minimize the impact of 
x-rays is contrary to the testimony of the technician and the 
well-documented case law (see T. 80). The degree of the intrusion 
and the risk of harm are substantial in this case. 
In determining whether the method was reasonable, the 
essentiality of the test must be balanced against the degree of 
intrusion and the risk of harm. In the present case, officers could 
have placed Mr. Palmer in isolation and under observation during the 
time it would have taken to get a search warrant. Sgt. Mayo 
acknowledged that it would take less than two hours to obtain a 
search warrant (T. 40, 41). A single officer guarding Mr. Palmer 
for those two hours would have required less resources than sending 
at least three officers to the hospital with him for an x-ray. 
Furthermore, the ring would have passed through his system in a 
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short period of time. Mr. Palmer was ultimately placed in isolation 
and the ring passed through his system (T. 61-2) . This could have 
been done without obtaining an x-ray. A warrantless x-ray under the 
circumstances in this case was not a reasonable method for locating 
the ring. 
2. The manner in which the x-ray was conducted was 
not reasonable. 
The inquiry into whether a bodily intrusion is conducted in 
a reasonable manner includes a consideration of whether the test was 
conducted "in a hospital environment according to accepted medical 
practices" along with a consideration of the factual circumstances 
under which it was taken. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-2. In the 
present case, a trained x-ray technician conducted the x-ray at a 
hospital after a doctor issued a requisition for such procedure 
(T. 43-4). It is not clear that the technician took a medical 
history on Appellant; whether a doctor examined Mr. Palmer, as is 
the usual procedure when an x-ray is taken; or whether the procedure 
was otherwise carried out in a medically approved fashion (T. 45). 
More importantly, however, the facts establish that the officers 
used excessive force and acted in an unreasonable manner in 
compelling Mr. Palmer to be x-rayed. 
The concept of unreasonable use of force during a bodily 
intrusion by the State first arose in the context of fourteenth 
amendment substantive due process. In Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 (1952), officers caused an emetic solution to be forced 
through a tube into the stomach of the suspect until he vomited. 
The Court determined that the police behavior shocked the conscience 
and would not allow the conviction to stand. 
Since Rochin, various courts have focused on the due 
process violation when analyzing excessive use of force or police 
misconduct in carrying out a search. See, e.g., United States v. 
Townsend, 151 F.Supp. 378 (D.C. 1957); Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 
851, 853-5 (10th Cir. 1981). 
However, it appears that the reliance by the United States 
Supreme Court on due process for its decision in Rochin was due, in 
part, to the fact that Rochin was decided prior to the fourth 
amendment being made applicable to the states through the fourteenth 
amendment. See People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 627. Given that 
the fourth amendment is now applicable to the states and in light of 
the holding in Schmerber that bodily intrusion searches must be done 
in a reasonable manner, it appears that the use of excessive force 
in carrying out a bodily intrusion search is more appropriately 
raised on fourth amendment grounds rather than on substantive due 
process grounds.5 See People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 627. 
In Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989), the United 
States Supreme Court determined that a claim that officers used 
excessive force in the course of a "seizure" of a person should be 
5
 In the event that this Court disagrees, Appellant 
alternatively raises the argument that the excessive use of force to 
compel the x-ray violates due process under the fourteenth amendment 
and cites Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), and its 
progeny, in support of this argument. 
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analyzed under the fourth amendment rather than under substantive 
due process. The rationale of Graham is just as applicable to a 
search under the fourth amendment and supports the argument that 
excessive use of force by officers in carrying out a bodily 
intrusion search should be analyzed under the reasonable manner 
prong of the Schmerber test. See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 
832 (8th Cir. 1986) (suggestion that use of excessive force an 
important consideration in determining whether x-ray violated fourth 
amendment). 
In the instant case, the officers used unreasonable force 
in obtaining the x-ray. Mr. Palmer was in handcuffs and, after 
making it clear that he did not want to be x-rayed, became combative 
(T. 51-2). "He made a move to try and kick the x-ray tube," 
according to the technician (T. 51). It was clear that Appellant's 
combativeness would stop if officers stopped trying to x-ray him 
without a warrant (T. 50-3). 
At least three officers rushed toward Appellant and pinned 
him against the wall (T. 51-2). One officer grabbed him by the 
throat while at least two others held him by the arms. Although at 
least three officers were holding him by the throat and arms and he 
was in handcuffs, Mr. Palmer continued struggling to get away and 
voicing opposition to the test (T. 52). One of the officers 
continued to hold him by the throat as the officers moved him 
towards the table and physically placed him on the table. They 
placed a restraint over Mr. Palmer, and an officer held him down 
(T. 52-3). 
Carrying a struggling and kicking suspect who is being held 
at the throat to a table and strapping him down raises the level of 
intrusiveness and establishes that this x-ray was not taken in a 
medically approved or otherwise reasonable manner. Instead, it was 
an unreasonable intrusion in violation of the fourth amendment. 
D. THE X-RAY AND THE RING SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
The fourth amendment is violated in a case where there is a 
warrantless bodily intrusion unless the state can establish all 
three prongs of the Schmerber test. In the instant case, not only 
one but all three of the prongs were not established. Therefore, 
the x-ray and all of the fruits of the illegally seized x-ray, 
including the ring, must be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the illegally 
seized evidence. / 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of March, 1990. 
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